Book Review by Law Review, North Carolina
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 36 | Number 3 Article 5
4-1-1958
Book Review
North Carolina Law Review
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
North Carolina Law Review, Book Review, 36 N.C. L. Rev. 373 (1958).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol36/iss3/5
BOOK REVIEW
Municipal Law. By Charles S. Rhyne. Washington: National Insti-
tute of Municipal Law Officers. 1957. Pp. xxi, 1125. ' $10.00.
There has long been a need, as Mr. Rhyne points out in his intro-
duction, for a good one-volume reference book on municipal law. City
and town attorneys frequently need a quick case citation, perhaps to
support an opinion needed at a council meeting coming up within hours
or for immediate advice to a busy department head. McQuillin's twenty
volumes, encyclopedic and verbose and over-organized, are difficult to
use, are reliable in the long run only as leads to pertinent cases, and
are too expensive for the average city attorney with a general practice.-
The material on municipal corporations in Anerican Jurisprudence and
Corpus Juris Secundum is in general more compact and usable, but the
attorney must have the entire set for complete coverage of local govern-
mental problems. For convenience this new one-volume work covering
the whole span of municipal law is most welcome.
Mr. Rhyne has based this book on his long and successful experi-
ence as General Counsel of the National Institute of Municipal Law
Officers. As the "city attorney's attorney" he has, over a period of
twenty-two years, built up the largest single file of municipal legal
materials in the country. This file has been the basis for the monthly
and annual publications of the Institute and for the 144 special research
reports on special legal problems which it has published.
In format Muixipal Law is attractive and usable. The 1125 pages
are not too bulky, a very readable type face has been used, and the double
column arrangement on each page is easy to follow. There are both a
detailed table of contents and a complete index, making it simple to
locate any subject. The chapter headings are simple and easy to follow.
And, most important, the scope of the book conforms to the experience
of city attorneys today. It covers the field from incorporation to regu-
lation for aesthetic purposes, from airports to urban renewal, from
regulation of hog pens to the protection of civil rights.
There is one long-range disadvantage to the one-volume format.
Any legal text is, of course, out-of-date on publication to the extent that
new decisions and statutes are relevant. Apparently no provision has
been made for periodic supplements to Municipal Law, which means
that the municipal attorney must continue to keep current with the law
'McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1949).
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from other sources (such as the monthly publications of NIMLO) un-
til a new edition is found feasible.
Municipal Law is termed a "handbook on municipal law since
1910."2 As to purpose Mr. Rhyne appropriately states in the preface
that "a completely new approach and a completely new summary of the
law as it exists today is required. This study attempts that task."
Furthermore, the author states "that every action by the municipality
must be justified under its legal powers. This book is designed to aid
in those interpretations by restating the municipal law in use today as
revealed by the nation-wide experience and the material which is avail-
able in a most unique way through NIMLO."
Mr. Rhyne has set an ambitious goal. He has moved a long way
towards reaching that goal. Municipal Law is good; it is convenient;
it will be invaluable for city attorneys. But in recommending that
every city attorney purchase and use this book, as this reviewer does
most heartily, it is also necessary to point out its limitations.
This is not a book for pleasant evening reading. It is a reference
book for a busy attorney, but as a reference the text should have a stand-
ard of quality on which the attorney can rely. Though in general the
author does a good job of summarizing the law, even a casual examina-
tion of the book leads one to suspect that the text is more a compilation
of headnotes than an analytical treatment of judicial opinions. In some
places the text is misleading when it attempts to summarize a complex
issue or when it attempts to generalize conflicting points of view. Some-
times important qualifying words such as "in general," "usually," or "in
Oregon" (or Minnesota or Florida) are omitted when they had better
been retained. There are even contradictory statements from one chap-
ter to another, contradictions that would surely have been eliminated
with more careful editing.
Time and space make any comprehensive analysis impossible, but a
few examples should demonstrate the limitations inherent in the text,
limitations which the city attorney should understand. Here are two
such examples taken from the section defining generally the always
confusing "governmental-proprietary" distinction.
1. "A legislative declaration that a certain activity of a municipality
is a public governmental function is usually conclusive as to the nature
of that activity." (p. 68) Query? Then why has not the distinction
been erased by legislative act? Certainly North Carolina lawyers
' The date limitation appears only on the jacket, although the preface refers
to developments in the law during the last "thirty years." Perhaps the intention
was to summarize the developments since the last edition of Dillon's treatise.
See DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911). If so, this intention, and
limitation, should have been more specifically asserted.
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familiar with Rhodes v. AshevilleO could not subscribe to this statement.
While there are airport cases in a few states supporting the statement,
the Rhodes case (an airport case) is not cited as contradicting the gen-
eral statement. Furthermore, the text in the chapter on tort liability
acknowledges that the distinction is made by the courts.
2. "On the other hand, a municipality usually exercises proprietary
functions when it promotes the comfort, convenience, safety and happi-
ness of its own inhabitants rather than the welfare of the general public.
For example, proprietary functions usually include building and main-
taining bridges, streets and highways, water works, sewers, collection
of refuse, and similar activities." (p. 69) Later, in the chapter on
municipal tort liability, the author states that "the general rule is that
the collection, removal and disposal of garbage refuse and ashes are
governmental functions . . . ." (p. 774) Which statement are we to
believe? The latter is, of course, the general rule. And is responsi-
bility for streets and highways, for example, really considered by the
courts as a proprietary function? Again the. discussion in the chapter
on municipal tort liability is more precise and is a better generalization
of the confused state of the law concerning liability for failure to exercise
due care in the maintenance of streets. (pp. 750-51)
These are examples of contradictions. In the same section there are
inconsistencies from one sentence to another. Compare the statement
that "a municipality may own property and have property rights which
are so far private that they are not held at the pleasure of the legislature"
with the statement that "the fact that the operation of a particular
facility is conducted in a private or proprietary, as distinguished from
a governmental, capacity does not ordinarily free it from state control."
(p. 69) The former statement is frequentlr made, but except in a few
isolated decisions a municipality has not been given "rights which are
so far private that they are not held at the pleasure of the legislature."
Again, in discussing acquisition of municipal property, an Alabama
case 4 is cited as authority for the statement that "a municipal corpora-
tion may not acquire property for investment or speculation; nor become
a dealer in real estate." (p. 374) There may be cases actually supporting
this statement, but the holding in the cited cases does not. There is
dictum in the Alabama case, to be sure, but the relevance of the dictum
is questionable in view of the factual. situation.
It is perhaps obvious that a one-volume reference cannot take into
consideration all statutory provisions as well as judicial decisions. In
-230 N.C. 134, 52 S.E.2d 371 (1949), rehearing denied, 230 N.C. 759, 53
S.E.2d 313 (1949).
'Powell v. Birmingham, 258 Ala. 159, 61 So. 2d 11 (1952), cited in note 2 on
p. 374.
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a field so dependent on statutory law, however, judicial decisions give an
incomplete picture. It is one thing to make the statement that "it has
been uniformly held that municipal zoning laws and building regula-
tions do not apply to the erection, maintenance and control of state
owned and operated buildings or improvements." But is the picture
complete when there are state laws in existence expressly making state
buildings subject to municipal zoning regulations ?5 And yet on a few
points statutory law is specifically cited to present a more concrete
picture. For example, several North Carolina special acts are spe-
cifically cited as examples of extraterritorial zoning authority. (p. 321,
n. 29)
Again, in discussing municipal regulation of parking, Rhyne points
out that the Scoggin case,0 holding that North Carolina courts cannot
accept evidence of the registration of a motor vehicle as prima facie
evidence that the registered owner parked the vehicle, has been over-
ruled by subsequent legislation. (p. 447, notes 18 and 20) This is true.
But it is confusing to the user of this book to be told in one instance
that legislation has reversed the decision of the court and not to be told
in another. For example, in discussing special assessments, the state-
ment is made that "state property is generally immune from special
assessments levied by cities for public improvements" and that in line
with this rule "it has been held that a municipality lacks authority to levy
special assessments for curbs and gutters along a state highway and,
accordingly, an agreement between a municipality and a state whereby
the latter agrees to the levy of such special assessments against state
property is null and void." (p. 303) A North Carolina case is cited
in support of the latter statement.7 But, the case itself does not have
anything to do with the power of a municipality to levy assessments
against state property. It actually concerns the power of municipality
to levy assessments for the construction of a highway which is part of
the state highway system and for which the state has primary financial
responsibility. Moreover, while the general rule in North Carolina has
been that municipalities cannot levy special assessments against state
property, the general law has been amended to permit the state to
petition for such improvements and to pay the state's share of the cost
of such improvements.8
Citations obviously posed a difficult problem for the author. In order
to keep all the subject matter within the bounds of one volume, compre-
hensive citations from the states had to be discarded. The user must
realize, therefore, that the absence of a cited case from his jurisdiction
See, e.g., N.C. GzT. STAT. § 160-181.1 (1952).
6 State v. Scoggin, 236 N.C. 19, 72 S.E.2d 54 (1953).
Shaver Motor Co. v. Statesville, 237 N.C. 467, 75 S.E.2d 324 (1953).
8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-82 (1952).
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on any particular point does not mean that there are not cases in his
jurisdiction on that point. And the law in his jurisdiction may be con-
trary to the general statement of the law set forth by Mr. Rhyne. For
example, as noted above, the North Carolina court has held that opera-
tion of an airport is not a governmental function, even though the legis-
lature specifically provided that it should be considered as a govern-
mental function. The Rhodes case, giving the contrary North Carolina
view, is not cited by Mr. Rhyne.
With all the wealth of resources at the author's command, it is also
disappointing that more law review articles, notes, and comments are
not cited. Frequently the best analysis of difficult points of law can be
found in these materials, and yet relatively few are included.
Following McQuillin and other texts, Rhyne begins his book with
a definition of the city and town as a "municipal corporation" and moves
on to creation, extension of boundaries, dissolution, and municipal
charters before taking up basic consideration of municipal powers.
This is the traditional approach, but the force of tradition does not make
it any more logical. The doctine of legislative supremacy is still the
foundation-stone of municipal law, and it would seem to make sense to
start with the state, the state's responsibility for creating local political
subdivisions, and constitutional limitations which have been placed on
the state's legislative power over local governmental units. The creation
of municipal corporations, extension of corporate boundaries, and dis-
solution of municipalities are all easier to understand if one first under-
stands (1) such constitutional limitations as public purpose, delegation
of authority, and the requirement of public control, and (2) the consti-
tutional rights held by a municipality as against the state.
In fact, Municipal Law, like its other brethren in the legal reference
field, suffers from the lack of historical, administrative, and policy back-
ground material. Home rule becomes concrete only against the back-
ground of history. Zoning becomes understandable only against the
background and purpose of comprehensive planning. The zoning
ordinance is intended, theoretically at least, to be one of a number of
devices for carrying out a plan. And yet planning is discussed only after
59 sections on zoning. Urban renewal and slum clearance can be under-
stood, policy-wise and as a matter of law, only against the background
of how and why the city has come to be concerned with the regulation
of private land development and land use through abatement of
nuisances, building and housing codes, subdivision control, and zoning.
Yet urban renewal and slum clearance are discussed topically before
any of these subjects. Is it beyond the scope of a book on municipal
law to make reference to the administrative and legislative policy which
1958]
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motivates city governments, or must all policy objectives be gleaned from
a court's interpretation of policy in published cases?
This book is well adapted to give the attorney without prior experi-
ence in municipal law much of the background he needs. It does
not attempt to provide the administrative and policy background which
is essential if the attorney is to be a good municipal counselor. But if
it results in better-informed city attorneys, it will have met a real need.
As already pointed out, the book has its limitations. It is to be hoped
that municipal attorneys will give this edition a reception that will
encourage future revised editions. Revisions cannot help but make
this handbook steadily stronger and more useful, even indispensable, for
city attorneys.
GEORGE H. ESSER, JR.
Assistant Director
Institute of Government
Chapel Hill, N. C.
